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Abstract—Lyra2REv2 is a hashing algorithm that consists of a
chain of individual hashing algorithms and it is used as a proof-
of-work function in several cryptocurrencies that aim to be ASIC-
resistant. The most crucial hashing algorithm in the Lyra2REv2
chain is a specific instance of the general Lyra2 algorithm. In
this work we present the first FPGA implementation of the
aforementioned instance of Lyra2 and we explain how several
properties of the algorithm can be exploited in order to optimize
the design.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been a surge in the popularity of
cryptocurrencies, which are digital currencies that enable
transactions through a decentralized consensus mechanism.
Most cryptocurrencies are based on a blockchain, which is an
ever-growing list of transactions that are grouped in blocks.
Individual blocks in the chain are linked together using a
cryptographic hash of the previous block, which ensures resis-
tance against modifications, and every transaction is digitally
signed. A blockchain needs to be protected from the double
spending problem (i.e., an attacker spending the same digital
money twice) and this is generally achieved by using a proof-
of-work (PoW) system. This system requires that new blocks
provide proof that a certain amount of processing power went
into constructing them before they get accepted in the chain.
For cryptocurrencies, this is typically achieved by appending
random numbers to a block until its cryptographic hash meets
a certain condition. The chain with the most cumulative proof-
of-work (PoW) is accepted as the correct one, so that an
attacker must control more than half of the active processing
power to perform a double-spend attack. Processing nodes that
help to compute the hashes of new blocks (called miners) are
rewarded with a fraction of the cryptocurrency.
The first cryptocurrency, i.e., Bitcoin [1], was initially mined
using desktop CPUs. Then, GPUs were used to significantly
increase the hashing speed. Eventually, GPU mining was out-
paced by FPGA miners, which were in turn surpassed by ASIC
miners. Nowadays, the majority of the computing power on the
Bitcoin network is found in large ASIC farms, each operated
by a single entity, which makes the decentralized nature of
Bitcoin debatable. To solve this issue, new PoW algorithms
have been proposed that aim to be ASIC-resistant. ASIC
resistance is achieved by using hashing algorithms that are
highly serial, memory intensive, and parameterizable so that
a manufactured ASIC can be easily made obsolete by simply
changing some of the parameters, meaning that GPU mining is
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Fig. 1. The Lyra2REv2 chained hashing algorithm.
much more cost-effective. However, since GPUs are generally
much less energy-efficient than ASICs, a massive adoption of
ASIC-resistant cryptocurrencies would significantly increase
the (already very high) energy consumption of cryptocurrency
mining. FPGA-based miners, on the other hand, are flexible,
energy efficient, and readily available to the general public
at reasonable prices. Thus, they are an attractive platform for
ASIC-resistant cryptocurrencies.
A prime example of an ASIC-resistant hashing algorithm is
Lyra2REv2 (used by Vertcoin [2], MonaCoin [3], and other
cryptocurrencies), whose chained structure is shown in Fig. 1.
The BLAKE, Keccak, Skein, BMW, and CubeHash hashing
algorithms are well-known and have been studied heavily, both
from a theoretical and from a hardware implementation per-
spective, as they were all candidates in the SHA-3 competition.
On the other hand, to the best of our knowledge, no hardware
implementation of the version of Lyra2 [4], [5] that is used in
the Lyra2REv2 algorithm has been reported in the literature.
Contributions: In this paper, we present the first hardware
implementation of the version of Lyra2 used in Lyra2REv2
as a stepping stone towards the implementation of an
energy-efficient FPGA miner for Lyra2REv2 cryptocurrencies.
Post-layout results for two Xilinx FPGAs show that our
proposed Lyra2 hardware architecture consumes very few
FPGA resources to achieve a hashing throughput between
2.6 MHash/s and 3.7 MHash/s with an energy efficiency
between 432 nJ/Hash and 323 nJ/Hash.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide the necessary background on
some components of the Keccak and BLAKE2 hashing algo-
rithms, since they are also used in Lyra2.
A. The Keccak Duplex
Keccak is a family of hashing algorithms based on a crypto-
graphic sponge [6], [7]. A cryptographic sponge is a function
that takes an arbitrary-length input to produce an arbitrary-
length hashed output. Lyra2 uses a specific implementation
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Algorithm 1 The G-function of BLAKE2b as used in Lyra2
1: INPUTS: a, b, c, d
2: OUTPUTS: a′, b′, c′, d′
3: a′ ← a+ b
4: d′ ← (d⊕ a′)≫ 32
5: c′ ← c+ d′
6: b′ ← (b⊕ c′)≫ 24
7: a′ ← a′ + b′
8: d′ ← (d′ ⊕ a′)≫ 16
9: c′ ← c′ + d′
10: b′ ← (b′ ⊕ c′)≫ 63
of the sponge, called the duplex construction, which has a
state that is preserved across different inputs. The duplex
construction with naming conventions as adopted in Lyra2 can
be found in [8, Fig. 2]. It consists of a permutation function
f that operates on a w-bit state vector, where w = b+ c and
the parameters b and c are called the bitrate and the capacity
of the sponge, respectively, as well as a padding rule pad.
We note that the permutation f is iterative and performs a
pre-defined number of iterations, also called rounds.
A call to the duplex construction proceeds as follows. An
input string M is first fed into the duplex. Then, it is padded
to length b and XOR’d into the lower b bits of the state. The
state is then fed through the permutation f . The output of f is
the new state of the duplex, while its lower l bits are the output
hash, where l < b. If we consider the duplex construction as
an object H , then the aforementioned procedure is referred to
as a method H.duplex(M, l). The following two auxiliary
methods are useful to simplify the notation: H.absorb(M)
updates the state using the input M but discards the out-
put (equivalent to H.duplex(M, 0)), while H.squeeze(l)
reads l output bits and then calls H.absorb(∅), where ∅
denotes an empty input string.
B. The BLAKE2b Round Function
BLAKE2 [9] is a family of hash functions designed for fast
software implementations. It is the successor of BLAKE as
submitted to the SHA-3 competition [10]. The Lyra2 algorithm
heavily draws from the round function of BLAKE2b, the 64-
bit variant of BLAKE2. The round function consists of an
arrangement of blocks that apply a so-called G-function to a
16-word state, where one G-function operates on 4 different
state words. For BLAKE2b a word has 64 bits meaning that
16 state words amount to 1024 bits. The total round transforms
these 1024 bits using four G-blocks, rearranges the output, and
then does a four G-block transformation again. Algorithm 1
describes the modified BLAKE2b G-function as used in Lyra2.
III. THE SIMPLIFIED LYRA2 ALGORITHM OF LYRA2REV2
Lyra2 was initially created as a password hashing scheme
(PHS) for secure storage [4], [5].
Lyra2 uses the duplex construction from Keccak, where the
permutation function f is the round function from BLAKE2b.
In the remainder of the text, calls to a full-round (i.e., 12
iterations) duplex will be denoted as calls to H , while reduced-
round duplexing as calls to Hρ, where ρ denotes the reduced
number of rounds. Because the G-functions are specified to
Algorithm 2 The Lyra2 algorithm as specified in Lyra2REv2.
1: PARAMS:H, ρ, ω, T,R,C, k, b as H.b
2: INPUT: pwd
3: OUTPUT:K
. Bootstrapping Phase
4: params← len(K) || len(pwd) || len(pwd) || T ||R || C
5: H.absorb(pad(pwd || pwd || params))
. Setup Phase
6: for col← 0 to C − 1 do
7: M [0][C − 1− col]← Hρ.squeeze(b)
8: end for
9: for col← 0 to C − 1 do
10: M [1][C−1−col]←M [0][col]⊕Hρ.duplex(M [0][col], b)
11: end for
12: for row0 ← 2 to R− 1 do
13: prev0 ← row0 − 1
14: row1 ← row0 − 2
15: for col← 0 to C − 1 do
16: rand← Hρ.duplex(M [row1][col]M [prev0][col], b)
17: M [row0][C − 1− col]←M [prev0][col]⊕ rand
18: M [row1][col]←M [row1][col]⊕ (rand≪ ω)
19: end for
20: end for
. Wandering Phase
21: for row0 ← 0 to R · T − 1 do
22: prev0 ← row0 − 1
23: row1 ← lsw(rand) mod R
24: for col← 0 to C − 1 do
25: rand← Hρ.duplex(M [row1][col]M [prev0][col], b)
26: M [row0][col]←M [row0][col]⊕ rand
27: M [row1][col]←M [row1][col]⊕ (rand≪ ω)
28: end for
29: end for
. Wrap-up Phase
30: H.absorb(M [row1][0])
31: K ← H.squeeze(k)
operate on an array of 16 64-bit words, Lyra2 uses a duplex
with a width of w = 16 · 64 = 1024 bits. Pseudocode for
the simplified version of Lyra2 that is used specifically in
Lyra2REv2 is given in Algorithm 2 and can be compared
to the original Lyra2 pseudocode available in [4]. In the
following sections, we explain each phase of the simplified
Lyra2 algorithm in more detail.
A. Bootstrapping Phase
In the bootstrapping phase, the duplex is initialized with a
state that depends on the password input pwd, a salt (which
in Lyra2REv2 is set to be equal to pwd), and the parameters
T , R, and C by using a full-round absorb. The duplex H
in Algorithm 2 internally uses a bitrate b = 768 bits and
a capacity c = 256 bits. The H.absorb(·) call on line 5,
however, considers only inputs of 512 bits instead of b bits, so
as to not overwrite the upper part of the initialization state, i.e,
the 512-bit initialization value IV specified by BLAKE2b. This
results in two full-round absorbs, where the first and second
absorbs process (pwd ||pwd) and pad(params), respectively.
B. Setup Phase
During the setup phase, an R × C × b memory matrix M
is initialized using the single-round duplex H1. During setup,
rows are initialized from first to last, while columns within
a row are initialized from last to first. From the second row
onward a previous row is re-read, making it impractical to
only store parts of the memory matrix. Also, from the third
row onward, in addition to the previous row, i.e., prev0, a
specific pre-initialized row, i.e., row1, is revisited (i.e., read
and updated) in a deterministic manner. Rows are re-read or
revisited from the first to the last column. Revisited rows use a
rotated version of the duplex output, where the rotation number
is chosen as ω = 64 in Lyra2REv2.
C. Wandering Phase
The wandering phase is generally the most time-consuming
phase and it proceeds similarly to the setup phase. Specifically,
it revisits two rows row0 and row1, where row0 is chosen
deterministically but row1 is chosen in a pseudorandom fash-
ion by using the least significant part of the duplex output. We
note that the pseudorandom and deterministic row can collide,
resulting in the operations on line 26 and 27 to sequentially
read from and then write to the same matrix cell.
D. Wrap-up Phase
The wrap-up phase consists of a full-round absorb of a
specific cell of M followed by a squeeze of the hashed output
K. This specific cell is likewise pseudorandom, as it is selected
as the first cell of the lastly revisited pseudorandom row. The
requested squeeze length k = 256 is lower than the bitrate
b = 768, which means that the final output is provided directly
from the duplex state without a permutation f .
IV. FPGA IMPLEMENTATION OF SIMPLIFIED LYRA2
In the current instance of Lyra2 as used in Lyra2REv2, the
timecost parameter is T = 1, the number of rows in the
memory matrix is R = 4, the number of columns in the
memory matrix is C = 4, and the desired hashing output
length is k = 256. We note that our architecture is optimized
for these parameter values, but it can be modified relatively
easily to accommodate potential parameter changes if a hard
fork is decided. Moreover, for the aforementioned parameters,
the memory matrix M is 1.5 kB in size, which is clearly not
prohibitively large to be implemented either on an FPGA or
on an ASIC. The claimed ASIC-resistance of the Lyra2REv2
algorithm comes from the fact that T , C, and R can be
increased easily if necessary.
The datapath of our proposed FPGA implementation of the
simplified Lyra2 algorithm used in Lyra2REv2 is shown in
Fig. 2, where the duplex construction with its state, round, and
XOR input block can be clearly distinguished. The memory
matrix M is mapped to a block RAM (BRAM). To reduce
the complexity of the multiplexer (MUX) at the input of the
duplex, the BRAM also contains constant vectors of b bits used
during the bootstrapping and setup phases: an all-zero vector
and the pad(params) vector. We first describe a version of
the hardware architecture where each round of the f function
is executed in a single clock cycle (CC). We then describe how
this basic architecture can be improved through pipelining.
A. Basic Iterative Architecture
Our basic iterative Lyra2 architecture requires 68 CCs per
hash: 24 for the bootstrapping phase, 16 for the setup and
wandering phases, and 12 for the wrap-up phase.
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Fig. 2. Datapath of our proposed Lyra2 FPGA architecture.
1) Bootstrapping Phase: During the bootstrapping phase,
the duplex processes two 512-bit input blocks from
pad(pwd || pwd || params) using a full-round absorb. In
Lyra2REv2, pwd = cubeout, with cubeout the output from
CubeHash, the previous algorithm in the chain. Thus, as shown
in Fig. 2, the (pwd || pwd) vector is one of the inputs to the
duplex’s MUX. On the other hand, the pad(params) vector
is fed into the sponge by loading it on qa while simultaneously
loading the all-zero vector on qb. Both constants are stored at
known addresses in the BRAM, and are absorbed in a separate
12-round Bootstrap state. During bootstrapping, the duplex
only receives an input vector in the first round. Hence, for
subsequent rounds, qa and qb output the all-zero vector, and
their sum is passed to the duplex via its input MUX.
2) Setup Phase: We split the setup phase into three dis-
tinct phases for convenience, namely Setup0, Setup1, and
Setup2, which correspond to Lines 6–8, Lines 9–11, and
Lines 12–20 of Algorithm 2, respectively. Similarly to the
bootstrapping phase, the setup phase uses the all-zero vector
stored in the BRAM. In the Setup0 state, the squeezes input
an empty message into the duplex and directly write the duplex
output to the BRAM. To achieve that, the all-zero vector is
output on qa, qb, and qc. Setup1 reads the all-zero vector
on qb, but a specific vector from the BRAM on qa. Setup2
reads two vectors from qa and qb. Both the duplex output and
the rotated duplex output are XORed with two other vectors
from the BRAM, requiring the two XOR blocks in parallel
illustrated in Fig. 2. On the control path, counters keep track of
the various rows (row0, row1, prev1) and their corresponding
columns to generate read and write addresses for the RAM.
3) Wandering Phase: The input to the duplex in the wan-
dering phase is always the word-wise addition of two RAM
cells. Both XOR blocks connected to the duplex output are
used. As mentioned before, the pseudorandom and determinis-
tic rows used in the wandering phase can collide. In hardware,
this special case requires the output of one XOR block to input
to the other, while the write port of the first XOR block needs
to be disabled to prevent write collisions on the RAM.
4) Wrap-Up Phase: Wrap-up inputs one RAM cell into
the sponge and then processes it using a full-round absorb.
For the following squeeze, the requested hashed-output length
k is lower than the bitrate b, meaning that the duplex state at
that point directly provides the output hash.
B. Memory Matrix
In the wandering phase, up to two RAM cells need to
be written and three RAM cells need to be read per CC.
These operations cannot be spread over multiple CCs without
affecting the overall throughput of the design. Therefore, we
use standard two-port BRAMs along with multipumping and
replication techniques [11] in order implement the required
functionality. Replication provides extra read ports by physi-
cally replicating the BRAM while connecting the write ports
to keep the two copies coherent. Multipumping operates the
BRAM at double the clock frequency of the surrounding logic,
which, together with replication, effectively provides four read
ports and two write ports.
C. Pipelined Architecture
Pipelining the BLAKE2b round function can greatly reduce
the delay of the critical path, which extends from the RAM
read ports to the RAM write ports in the basic iterative version
described above. Eight pipeline stages in the round were found
to optimally increase throughput/area. Each hash that is con-
currently being processed by the core needs its own memory.
However, extra RAM-based memory is readily available since
the current Lyra2REv2 parameters result in a RAM depth
much shallower than that of the FPGA BRAMs. With adequate
scheduling, concurrent hashes write to the same BRAMs in
distinct CCs. While read ports qa and qb feed the duplex, qc
and qd feed the XORs with duplex outputs. When pipelining
the round function, qc and qd therefore need to be delayed
by as many CCs as there are pipeline stages. The extra read
port that is unused in the basic architecture allows delaying
the control path for qd rather than using a delayed version of
qb, avoiding a long chain of 768-bit registers. Eight pipeline
stages in the round increase the latency to 544 CCs per hash.
On the other hand, eight hashes are processed concurrently
and the achievable clock frequency more than doubles, so the
overall hashing throughput is improved significantly.
V. HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
To the best of our knowledge, there is no FPGA imple-
mentation of Lyra2 in the literature. For this reason, we can
unfortunately not provide comparative FPGA implementation
results. Moreover, since in this work we only present a core
for Lyra2 and not a full miner architecture, we can also not
compare our implementation to existing FPGA miners for
cryprocurrencies based on other PoW algorithms.
Table I presents post-fitting results for the Xilinx Virtex 7
485T FPGA featured on the Xilinx VC707 Evaluation Kit as
well as for the Xilinx Zynq Ultrascale+ 7EV FPGA from the
ZCU104 Evaluation Kit. The power-consumption estimation
TABLE I
POST-FITTING RESULTS FOR XILINX FPGAS.
FPGA Virtex 7 Zynq485T Ultrascale+ 7EV
Area (slices or CLBs) 2 163 (2.85%) 1 153 (4.00%)
LUTs 6 047 (1.99%) 6 010 (2.61%)
Registers 8 296 (1.37%) 8 296 (1.80%)
RAM (kbits) 1 548 (4.27%) 1 548 (5.39%)
Frequency (MHz) 175 250
T/P (MHash/s) 2.58 3.69
Dyn. Power (W) 1.12 1.19
Energy Eff. (nJ/Hash) 432 323
was obtained using Xilinx’s Vivado Power Estimator tool,
where the timing constraints are those required for the oper-
ating frequencies of Table I, the switching activity is from the
simulation of the Lyra2 core processing random input vectors,
and the post-fitted design provided to the tool meets all timing
constraints. Table I reports the estimated dynamic power for
the Lyra2 core. The functionality of the Lyra2 core was verified
against test vectors that were generated using CPUminer [12].
From Table I, looking at the number of slices or CLBs
required for the Virtex and Zynq FPGAs, respectively, it can
be seen that the proposed Lyra2 core amounts to less than 4%
of the resources available. The amount of RAM occupied is
the same for both FPGAs, however the usage share is greater
for the Zynq as it has less RAM blocks than FPGAs from
the Virtex series. Also, from Table I, it can be seen that the
throughout is 2.58 MHash/s and 3.69 MHash/s for the Virtex
and Zynq FPGAs, respectively. The estimated dynamic power
consumption of the Lyra2 core is under 1.2 W for both FPGAs.
As a result, the energy efficiency is estimated to be in the
vicinity of 325 to 435 nJ/Hash.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented the first hardware implementa-
tion of the Lyra2 hashing algorithm, tailored to Lyra2REv2,
an ASIC-resistant chained hashing algorithm employed by a
few cryptocurrencies. The key to achieve good throughput
and energy efficiency is to efficiently map the memory matrix
to FPGA RAM blocks and to pipeline the BLAKE2b round
function. Based on post-fitting results for two Xilinx FPGAs,
we believe that the proposed Lyra2 implementation is a
promising core for the purpose of FPGA-based Lyra2REv2
mining.1 For example, we showed that, for a Zynq Ultrascale+
FPGA featured on an affordable evaluation kit, the achievable
throughput is of 3.7 MHash/s and the energy efficiency of
323 nJ/Hash, for a resource usage of 4%.
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